with low-key enforcement processes such as warnings and inspections, leaving prosecutions as a top tier, and last-resort mechanism. Although smart and responsive regulation is useful to foster compliance, failings in the operation of the commercial kangaroo industry dilute this positive influence. In particular, smart and responsive regulation has limits where a regime develops systemic failure.
14 Although there is insufficient evidence to reach such a definitive conclusion with respect to animal welfare outcomes of the commercial kangaroo industry, the data discussed in this paper reveals a trend that warrants close monitoring of the industry.
The discussion commences with a brief overview of smart and responsive regulation in order to provide context for the examination of the legal and regulatory framework that follows. In examining the regulatory framework, the discussion highlights the importance of inspections, not only as an enforcement mechanism but also as a means for governments and stakeholders to appraise the operation of the Code. The Code itself is voluntary and needs to be made operational within statebased regimes. Some weaknesses in the Code stem from the way the Code is integrated into regulation at the state level; this regularly happens by incorporation into nature conservation legislation rather than animal protection legislation. 15 The integration of this Code within the nature conservation legislation rather than animal protection legislation gives it a somewhat ambiguous status, particularly in relation to how the Code relates to animal cruelty offences. 16 In evaluating the effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms, this paper concentrates on the inspectorial priorities of the relevant enforcement agencies. The research accesses available data on inspections to determine the number of inspections and offences detected in each state and, in particular, whether there are differences between the states. There are two steps to the methodology adopted: the first step was to locate and analyse the background material from journal 8 Code, s 2.4 and s 5. articles and published reports; the second step was to analyse the primary materials available, including the Code, state legislation, regulations, annual reports of government agencies and other materials. 17 Finally, the paper considers enforcement outcomes in the states, focusing upon penalty infringement notices, warning notices and compliance letters. These actions form the bulk of enforcement activity in relation to the kangaroo industry. In the context of smart and responsive regulation, these methods are regarded as low to mid-range ways of addressing compliance issues. The paper seeks to identify relationships between inspectorial practices and these mid-low level enforcement outcomes. The paper does not assess prosecutions or sentencing outcomes, which are beyond its scope. However, it assesses data collected by the regulatory agencies that indicates that compliance with the Code is uncertain. This calls into question whether self-regulation is succeeding and, if not, whether this warrants consideration of new approaches.
Smart regulation and responsive regulation
'Smart regulation' is a regulatory model 18 that emphasises designing regulatory responses that take into account the needs, views and motivations of stakeholders against the backdrop of the 'cultural, economic, and institutional' environment of the regulatory regime.
19 The smart regulatory model incorporates five principles that include using the optimum mix of instruments and institutional combinations: 20 the use of 'less interventionist measures'; 21 a pyramid of enforcement starting from persuasions and warnings through to sanctions such as civil and criminal penalties and loss of licence; systems that are also the essence of responsive regulation; 22 and harnessing the power of other parties, such as industry associations and pressure groups.
23
'Responsive regulation' utilises a prudent mix of compliance and deterrence and differs from smart regulation because it focuses more on the conduct of the regulated parties and less on a mix of regulatory mechanisms that may be suitable to the regulated. 24 In accordance with responsive regulation, governments entrust stakeholders with much of the operation of regimes, 25 and it is incumbent on government to negotiate and settle regulatory responses with 'the regulated'.
26
The regulatory pyramid is an enforcement mechanism common to both systems that proffers a broad base of soft measures such as education and warning letters, middle-range measures that include inspections and higher-range measures based on penalties including suspension of licences. 27 Although the pyramid offers a range of measures, the recommendation is that regulators start at the base rather than the top or middle of the pyramid except in exceptional or life-threatening circumstances. 28 Once regulators have tried low-key approaches, the more 'coercive control comes to be seen as more legitimate'.
29
Although smart regulation and responsive regulation differ, they share similarities that juxtapose them against command and control systems. At the same time, the effectiveness of smart and responsive regulation has limits. For example, the regulatory pyramid focuses on escalation of penalties, yet, in some circumstances, different responses may be more appropriate. These can include investigating systemic issues such as the operation of an industry or exploring the possibility of tightening entry to an industry by increasing licensing requirements. 33 Other critiques of smart and responsive models focus on the fact that the models 'come into play only after substantive policy goals have been articulated'. 34 Thus, the models build on existing frameworks rather than determining what those frameworks should be. If an industry or stakeholder sector is powerful or politically influential, it may obstruct development and reform of policy and regulation. 35 Moreover, although, as a rule, threats and deterrents should be used sparingly, 36 advice found in the literature also advocates using the 'big stick' approach. In these cases, responsive and smart regulation is reinforced by sufficient command and control measures to enhance enforcement of regimes and act as a deterrent:
'Speak softly and carry a big stick' is an appropriate aphorism for today's environmental regulator, but to be effective there must be certainty that the big stick can and will be used and the how, why and where of its use. It is the anticipation of enforcement action that confers the ability to deter.
37
Braithwaite notes the 'big stick' is important in cases of 'system capacity overload' where offenders realise that the likelihood of their being punished is low. In these cases, the fact that the regulator can step in with serious punishments will more likely lead to offenders forming their own compliance plans, which should lead to enhanced compliance.
38
The enforcement mechanisms of the Code are consistent with the regulatory pyramid model that provides a range of processes, including inspections, penalties, loss of licence and prosecutions that are part of the regulatory framework for the commercial kangaroo industry. However, this does not automatically mean that the regime is meeting its stated objectives.
Legal and regulatory framework
The objectives of the Code are clearly set out in terms of animal welfare:
This Code has been produced to ensure that all persons intending to shoot free-living kangaroos or wallabies for commercial purposes undertake the shooting so that the animal is killed in a way that minimises pain and suffering.
39
The way that the Code achieves this objective is by detailing how shooters accomplish rapid death of the target animals. 40 To start with, shooters should aim for the brain of the target animal, 41 as this results in a quick, and comparatively painless death. Shooters should also avoid shooting female kangaroos where it is obvious that they have pouch young or dependent young at foot except in special circumstances. 42 In addition, if a female is shot, then her dependent young must be killed as the use of a blow to the base of the skull. 43 The Code also contains further directives that deal with the type of ammunition to be used and follow-up procedures on multiple kills.
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The Code itself is not enforceable, which means that it is the responsibility of the states to make the Code operational. However, because the states vary in their approaches, the Code's enforceability and integration into each state's legal framework varies (Table 1 ). In particular, the Code does not permit the use and sale of carcasses that are not killed in accordance with its provisions, which means the states have some discretion in determining which carcasses will be regarded as Codecompliant and which will not be Code-compliant. This also means that the states can vary in their regulation across the kangaroo industry supply chain. The licensee must not possess or sell any kangaroo carcass containing a bullet wound in the body.
Section 133(4) of the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 (NSW)
A licence holder shall not contravene or fail to comply with any condition or restriction attached to the licence.
The maximum penalty for individuals is 100 penalty units which equates to $11,000 and if the offence is a continuing one 43 Ibid s 5. 44 Permit holders must not sell or supply a kangaroo carcass unless (a) the kangaroo was taken in accordance with the Code; and (b) the kangaroo has not suffered damage from a firearm other than damage to the head or damage to the head and such damage as results from a single shot to the heart.
The maximum penalty is $1000. All shooting is to be carried out in accordance with the Code.
WA

Condition 2 of the Licence to Take Kangaroos for Sale
Only kangaroos that have been killed by a single shot to the brain shall be delivered to a licensed kangaroo processor.
Condition 2 of the Licence to Process
The licensee shall only accept the carcasses of kangaroos that were killed by a single shot to the brain.
Condition 4 of the Licence to Deal in Skins
The licensee shall only accept the skins of kangaroos that were killed by a single shot to the brain. As already noted, the Code is designed to regulate animal welfare within the kangaroo commercial industry based on smart and responsive regulation that is stakeholder-led. Accordingly, the provisions of the Code have been developed with input from stakeholders; the enforcement mechanisms follow the tenor of regulatory pyramid model; and the Code itself is voluntary, although it is integrated into state regulation by a variety of means. Given that commercial kangaroo hunting occurs in a range of locations, it is not feasible for governments to provide inspectors at the point of kill. The Code thus focuses on the conduct of hunters and stakeholders in the supply chain, relying on their compliance. Yet the inconsistent implementation of the Code at the state legislative level, as well as across the supply chain, raises issues directly related to the enforceability of the Code and the efficacy of the regime that oversees the commercial kangaroo industry. Two issues are particularly significant: first, identification of enforcement agencies and an understanding of their role; and, second, the extent of compliance with the provisions of the Code.
Enforcement and compliance
The regulatory pyramid places inspections at the mid-range level, and accepted practice is to start from a lower level, with less coercive measures, such as education and warning letters. However, inspections are an important component of the commercial kangaroo industry as they not only operate at an enforcement level, but also assist with identifying whether the regime is meeting the animal welfare objectives of the Code. Accordingly, if inspections are not carried out properly, or indeed not carried out at all, it means that regulators cannot say with certainty whether the Code is operating as intended; and, if not, whether this indicates systemic failure or other flaws warranting greater government intervention. The methodology adopted for the research of the next sections of this paper involved obtaining the annual reports of the various state regulatory bodies, some of which were already publicly available. The statistics available in these reports were compiled and analysed individually and comparatively.
Enforcement agencies
Responsibility for enforcement of the relevant laws in relation to the commercial kangaroo industry rests primarily with state government agencies, including:
• • Other bodies involved in enforcement including national parks, police and food safety agencies/departments.
These agencies/departments have multiple interests, including operating a kangaroo management program and ensuring the welfare of kangaroos. The ability and resolve of these agencies to inspect, charge and prosecute offenders may be impeded by conflicts of interest, and much of the focus is upon promoting industry compliance with the Code. It is generally difficult to assess the full impact of this conflict of interest, but one result is the development of a reactive regime that largely focuses Tables 2 and 3 ). In the last quarter of 2009, DEHP undertook an internal review and decided to inspect at least one per cent of total carcasses in 2010. 63 DEHP also introduced a target to conduct a detailed inspection of at least ten per cent of the carcasses inspected. 64 The same targets were used in 2011. 65 In both 2010 and 2011 DEHP exceeded its targets for inspections (8306 and 10,133 respectively) and detailed inspections (2290 and 1793 respectively).
In NSW, between 2006 to 2011, the Office of Environment and Heritage (OEH) conducted regular inspections of chillers for a number of possible compliance breaches, including non-head shot kangaroos (Table 2) . 66 Shooters' vehicles were inspected for possible compliance breaches, none of which concern the Code ( 
Quality of inspections
Enforcement agencies do not regularly inspect shooters to ensure compliance with the Code, particularly with respect to agencies in QLD and WA, which do not conduct any inspections of shooters. Although DEWNR (SA) and OEH (NSW) claim to inspect shooters on an opportunistic basis, these bodies do not report the number of inspections carried out. A further problem is that inspections of shooters in NSW do not relate to the conditions of the Code but instead relate to other matters.
The general lack of inspections of shooters by the enforcement agencies means that these agencies cannot ensure that shooters are complying with the Code. Inspections of shooters are an essential precondition to ensure compliance and the detection of offences, particularly in relation to the killing of dependent young and injured kangaroos. This is already a major problem, as the RSPCA discovered in 2002 when their research identified that shooters have difficulty capturing and killing young at foot. 77 As already discussed, the Code specifies the way in which young kangaroos need to be killed.
In the light of the RSPCA report, it is significant that no training is required in methods for killing dependent young prior to the granting of a shooter's licence, and that such killing occurs without any direct monitoring. 78 From an animal welfare perspective, these two points raise critical matters regarding the supervision and enforcement of animal welfare perspectives in kangaroo shooting. This also gives rise to a wider issue regarding the role of monitoring, a process which is consistent with smart and responsive regulation. As Wright and Head have noted, monitoring can inform whether regulation, in this case the Code, is operating as intended, and whether more or less government intervention is required.
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The available data reveals substantial variability across the states in relation to the inspection of chillers (Table 3) . Inspection of chillers is important because it provides information on whether the kangaroos have been shot in accordance with the Code. In 2010, DEWNR (SA) conducted 92 inspections of 67 chillers and OEH (NSW) conducted 659 inspections of 150 chillers. In contrast, DEC (WA) conducted just five inspections of 574 chillers. Thus, while chillers in SA and NSW were inspected at least once in that year (and in NSW much more), the majority of chillers in WA were not inspected at all. Therefore, chillers in WA are subject to substantially less inspectorial activity than similar enterprises in other states. This situation greatly increases the risk that offences in the commercial kangaroo industry will not be detected in WA. This risk is amplified by the fact that DEC did not inspect shooters during 2010. The risk is further amplified by the fact that DEC did not inspect shooters and had a very low rate of inspections of chillers. A summary of the variation of inspectorial activities for shooters, chillers and processors across the states for 2010 is provided in Table 4 .
Only DERM (QLD) disclosed the total number of carcasses inspected. In 2010, 3.1 per cent of carcasses were inspected in QLD. Although this result exceeds DERM's target, it also means that 96.9 per cent of carcasses were not inspected at all during that year. However, this disclosure provides an insight into the level of inspectorial activity and should be disclosed by the other states to aid analysis of enforcement.
Enforcement outcomes and regulatory models: Penalty infringement notices, warning notices and compliance letters
This part of the paper evaluates enforcement outcomes by examining infringement notices, warning notices and compliance letters in QLD, NSW, SA and WA. As already discussed, inspections which would ordinarily detect breaches of the Code are conducted at a low rate. Nevertheless, the data still reveals that substantial breaches stem from non-adherence to the welfare outcomes of the Code that focus on the method by which the animals are killed.
In QLD, DERM issues Infringement Notices, compliance letters and warning notices. These forms of enforcement actions are used for 'common breaches of the law where the impacts are not serious enough for court action'. 80 The payment of an Infringement Notice does not result in the recording of a criminal conviction. 81 Officers have discretion as to whether to serve an Infringement Notice but must take into account the intention of the statute to penalise breaches. 82 DERM may also cancel or suspend licences given the meeting of certain conditions. 83 DERM has issued compliance letters, warning notices and Infringement Notices to offenders in the commercial kangaroo industry Table 3 . The majority of breaches detected by DERM have related to reporting requirements. However, there have been some offences detected that relate to the Code (Table 11 ). In 2004, there was one 'minor investigation' of carcasses that were non-head shot but the outcome of this investigation was not disclosed. 84 In 2007, there were two instances of 'clear breaches of the code of practice with regard 80 Department of Environment and Resource Management, Enforcement Guidelines (October 2010) 9 <http://www.ehp.qld.gov.au/management/pdf/enforcement-guidelines.pdf>. 81 Ibid. 82 Ibid. 83 Ibid 14. These conditions are: when the breach of licence conditions has had serious consequences to human health, environment or natural resources; continual minor breaches have occurred despite warning being given by DERM; and provision is made for the automatic cancellation of the licence (eg accumulation of demerit points). In 2010 there was an increase in the number of offences detected that related to the Code. In 2010, eight of the Infringement Notices were incidents of 'body shot' carcasses 86 (Table 4 ). In 2011, there were ten Infringement Notices for the sale of carcasses with a body shot wound. 87 As was discussed above, DERM decided to inspect at least one per cent of carcasses in 2010. It appears that this increased level of inspectorial activity resulted in a higher rate of detection of body shot offences. It is also telling, that from Tables 5 and 7 -which deal with infringement notices, and tables 10 and 11 -which deal with interstate investigations, cases relating to killing, other than in accordance with the Code, represent numerically the biggest proportion of offences and incidents listed. It is also significant that these offences and occurrences go to the core of the animal welfare objectives of the Code. These objectives are predicated on the humane killing of kangaroos and their young and the data set out below provides sufficient material that justifies further investigation into the effectiveness of this aspect of the Code. In 2008, DERM disclosed the types of offences detected that results in compliance letters or warning notices (Table 6 ). None of these directly related to the Code.
OEH (NSW) issues Infringement Notices for minor, one-off breaches of criminal provisions and the payment of these fines does not result in the recording of a criminal conviction. 88 The majority of offences detected in NSW relate to reporting requirements, but there are some offences that relate to the Code (Table 6) . Fail to keep record/return book at prescribed place for prescribed time -4
Fail to properly attach tag immediately after Macropod is dressed -2
Fail to record relevant particulars within prescribed period -4
Relevant authority or identification not available for inspection -6 TOTAL 11 37 95 There were no similar offences in the other years (Table 7) . In 2008, there were five offences subject to penalties that related to the Code. 96 In 2009, there was one such offence. 97 There were no similar offences in the other years (Table 8 ).
In 2008, there were no permit cancellations but one shooter was informed that his permit would not be renewed on 1 July 2008 and had court action pending. 98 In 2009, there were no permit cancellations; however, two shooters were placed on probation on the basis that they had 'committed serious offences and were put on notice that any further offences may result in their licence being cancelled'. 99 In 2010, there were no permit cancellations. 100 In 2011, DEWNR cancelled the permit of one shooter on the basis of 'serious and on-going breaches of the Act'. 101 The shooter subsequently undertook re-accreditation training and the permit was renewed with probationary conditions. DEWNR detected a number of carcasses imported during 2009, 2010 and 2011 that had bullet wounds other than to the head or that were underweight. These carcasses came from NSW (Table 10) and QLD ( In an analogous manner, there is only one report of an offence detected relating to dependent young (QLD) and no reports of offences relating to the killing of injured kangaroos. These results are not surprising given that detection of these types of offences would require inspections at the point of kill, yet no enforcement agencies regularly carry out such inspections. A similar situation may be occurring in WA where no offences were detected for shooters ('Not applicable') or chillers. DEC conducts a very low rate of inspections of chillers which make the detection of offences difficult. Therefore, the statistics from WA that indicate a low level of offences, are likely to emanate from its low level of inspectorial activity that results in the detection of fewer or no offences.
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Conclusion
Regulatory theory based on smart and responsive regulation advocates the use of low-key enforcement and compliance methods in preference to penalties and suspensions. This philosophy is premised on the understanding that when stakeholders are involved in the design and implementation of regimes they are more likely to comply. Accordingly, regulators should invoke top-tier regulation only when necessary. This paper shows the results of an analysis of regulatory structures and state inspection reports carried out to assess how well the various state regulatory regimes operate on the kangaroo industry.
Overall, the legal and regulatory framework governing the killing of kangaroos could be improved to support more effective enforcement of the Code. In particular, the Code could be better integrated into state regulations to ensure that its provisions are enforceable in relation to all persons participating in the commercial kangaroo industry to the extent that these provisions are relevant. Furthermore, state departments charged with regulating the Code have multiple interests, including operating a kangaroo management program and ensuring the welfare of kangaroos. The ability and resolve of these agencies to inspect, charge and prosecute offenders may be impeded by conflicts of interest.
In order for the Code to be implemented effectively, it requires inspections to determine compliance levels. It is telling that increased inspections of shooters by DEHP (QLD) resulted in greater detections of offences. In contrast, the WA regime is particularly laggard in the detection of offences. Although the shooter's licences issued in WA are subject to conditions concerning the Code, the enforceability of these conditions is unclear. An extremely low rate of inspections of chillers (relative to other states) further exacerbates the matter, resulting in an inability to determine whether offences have occurred. It is clear that the laws and inspectorial practices of WA need to be reformed to align better with the standards set in other states.
The lack of consistent and uniform inspections presents the most significant gap in the regulatory activity within the kangaroo industry. Ten years ago (and less) there were no regular inspections (at least not on record). Inspection implementation has improved in recent years but variability of inspections within and amongst states is high and there is a lack of regular inspections of shooters. Gunningham et al 108 recognise the complexity involved in implementing Codes of Practice and note that highly interventionist approaches require substantial administrative resources, are generally less flexible and rate badly in terms of political acceptability. However, the Code may be operating under, what Braithewaite also describes as, 'system capacity overload'. 109 In such situations offenders realise that the likelihood of their being punished is low. Although soft approaches, such as compliance plans, can still be effective in these instances, the regulated need to be aware that the regulator will step in with more serious punishments.
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Command and control measures accompanied by enhanced methods of inspection can close the gap in regulatory activity. Top-tier regulatory responses, such as licence suspensions and revocations, should be applied in the worst cases, where the offender has been deliberately non-compliant or a repeat offender. Control measures such as minimum inspection rates can be included in the Code to ensure regular and uniform inspection rates. The inspection capability could be further enhanced by video surveillance mounted on shooters trucks -as has been suggested as a means to monitor the welfare of animals in the live export trade in overseas abattoirs 111 -and a greater number of inspections of carcasses at chillers. 
